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We use alternative assumptions about the divisibility of goods and money and the
ability of agents to use lotteries on money to investigate to what extent the indivisi-
bility of money is the cause for the typically ine!cient production and consumption
decisions in search-theoretic models of money. Our framework potentially generates
three types of ine!ciencies: the no-trade ine!ciency, where no trade takes place even
though it would be socially e!cient to trade; and the too-much-trade and too-little-
trade ine!ciencies, where the quantities produced and exchanged are either larger or
smaller than what the solution to a social planner’s problem would mandate. It is
shown that while the no-trade and the too-much-trade ine!ciencies are caused by the
indivisibility of money, the too-little-trade ine!ciency remains even when money is
divisible unless it is su!ciently valued.
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A well-known feature of search-theoretic models of money is that the outcome is generically
ine!cient in the sense that the quantities exchanged di"er from the solution to a social
planner’s problem. Some models predict that prices are too high. Models with this property
include the divisible money and divisible goods model of Shi (1997, 1999). Other models !nd
that prices can be too low. For certain parameter values, the divisible goods and indivisible
money models of Trejos and Wright (1995) and Shi (1995) display this outcome. Moreover,
in the indivisible money and indivisible goods model of Kiyotaki and Wright (1991), in some
meetings there is no production and consumption even though it would be socially e!cient
to trade.1
What lies behind these ine!ciencies? Although each paper in question explains the
reason for the observed ine!ciencies, there is no obvious basis for a comparison of their
results. The explanations for these ine!ciencies range from the decentralized nature of the
price formation (Trejos andWright, 1995; Shi, 1995) to the time-consuming exchange process
(Kiyotaki and Wright, 1991; Shi, 1997) or the details of the bargaining protocol.2 We are
therefore left with apparently unrelated explanations, which limits our understanding of the
search-theoretic approach.
This paper explores the nature of these ine!ciencies by providing a common frame-
work for assessing the di"erent models. We assume that the economy is composed of many
commodities, and that for each commodity there is a continuum of di"erentiated varieties.
Agents have idiosyncratic tastes for these varieties, and they choose strategies for determin-
ing when (and sometimes how much) to produce, to trade, and to consume. Because of the
randomness of the matching process, in a single-coincidence meeting the buyer’s preference
for the seller’s variety is represented by a random variable !: this is what we call a stochastic
mismatch problem.
Basically, the paper’s methodology is to introduce this stochastic mismatch problem into
the di"erent random-matching models of money in order to identify the consequences of the
alternative assumptions about the divisibility of money and goods. First, we compare the
indivisible goods and indivisible money model of Kiyotaki and Wright (1991, 1993) with the
same model when agents use lotteries on indivisible money to determine the terms of trade.3
1The no-trade ine!ciency is not explicitly mentioned in Kiyotaki and Wright (1991), but it is discussed
in Boldrin et al. (1993).
2According to Trejos and Wright (1995, p. 130), the fact that the quantity exchanged is too high is related
to the bargaining protocol and to the ability of the traders to meet other traders during the negotiation.
Furthermore, even when the traders do not meet other traders while bargaining, if the bargaining power of
buyers is su!ciently close to one, the quantity exchanged can be ine!ciently large (Wright, 1999).
3In contrast to Berentsen et al. (2000), who consider randomization over both indivisible goods and
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Second, we compare the divisible goods and indivisible money model of Trejos and Wright
(1995) and Shi (1995), the same model with lotteries on money, and the divisible money and
divisible goods model of Shi (1997, 1999). Introducing lotteries on money, like the study
of divisible money, will be useful for identifying the origin of the ine!ciencies that arise in
indivisible money models.
Our framework potentially generates three types of ine!ciencies that can arise simul-
taneously. First, there is what we call a no-trade ine!ciency: in some meetings there is
no production and consumption even though trading would be e!cient. Second, there is a
too-much-trade ine!ciency: in some meetings the quantities produced and exchanged are
larger than what the solution to a social planner’s problem would dictate. Third, there is a
too-little-trade ine!ciency: in some meetings production is too small relative to the planner’s
solution.
The following results emerge from the analysis. First, the no-trade and the too-much-
trade ine!ciencies are caused by the indivisibility of money. They are present neither in the
divisible money model nor in indivisible money models when lotteries are allowed. Second,
the too-little-trade ine!ciency appears in all models. This ine!ciency is due to the impa-
tience of the traders and the time-consuming nature of the exchange process. Third, the set
of meetings where the quantities traded are ine!ciently low is smaller, and the purchasing
power of money larger, when money is divisible. Fourth, the bargaining procedure, particu-
larly the bargaining power of buyers and sellers, plays a much less important role than we
expected. In fact, we !nd that the results stated above do not depend on the bargaining
power of the buyers.
We also show how the divisibility of money a"ects the Pareto frontier of the bargaining
set in a match between a buyer and a seller. The bargaining set of the bargaining game with
divisible money (or with indivisible money and lotteries) always contains the bargaining set
of the game with indivisible money. The reason for this result is that indivisible money,
in contrast to divisible money (or lotteries), transfers utility imperfectly. Intuitively, when
money is perfectly divisible, the buyer makes a monetary transfer to compensate the seller
for his production cost. Because money is equally valued by the buyer and the seller, money
is a perfect means to transfer utility. When money is indivisible, however, the seller adjusts
the quantity he produces to compensate the buyer for the indivisible unit of money. In
contrast to a transfer of divisible money, real production is an ine!cient means to transfer
utility, because of the decreasing marginal utility of consumption. Graphically, the fact that
indivisible money, we will only consider lotteries on money. This restriction allows us to focus on the
implications of indivisible money, because it introduces a notion of divisible money without a"ecting the
indivisibility of goods.
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divisible money (or indivisible money with lotteries) transfers utility perfectly is illustrated
by a Pareto frontier which is partially linear with divisible money (or with indivisible money
and lotteries) and strictly concave with indivisible money without lotteries.
Our framework makes the divisibility of money visible. In our divisible money model,
we !nd a threshold ! such that in a single-coincidence meeting if a buyer’s valuation for the
seller’s good is below !, he only spends a fraction of his money holdings, and if his valuation
is above, he spends his entire money holdings. Moreover, if ! ! !, a socially e!cient quantity
of the good is produced and exchanged, and if ! " !, an ine!ciently small quantity is traded.
In contrast, in Shi’s (1997, 1999) divisible money model, buyers in each meeting spend their
entire money holdings, and they always receive ine!ciently small quantities of goods in
exchange.4 Interestingly, we !nd that the model with indivisible money, divisible goods,
and lotteries and the divisible money model yield very similar results, because in the lottery
model there is also a threshold ! that has the same properties as above.
We also show that the indivisibility of money can generate a welfare-improving role for
in"ation. In the indivisible goods and indivisible money model, in"ation has a positive e"ect
on welfare, because in"ation induces agents to spend their indivisible units of money more
quickly. This e"ect is also present in the divisible goods and indivisible money model. In this
model, however, an increase in the growth rate of the money supply has also an intensive
e"ect by reducing the quantities of goods traded in each match. In the divisible money
model or the indivisible money model with lotteries, in"ation always reduces welfare.
Our paper is related to search models of money that study the role of the divisibility
assumption in monetary exchange. Taber and Wallace (1999) consider the divisibility of
money in the setups due to Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995) by relaxing the re-
strictions on agents’ money holdings. Money is said to be twice as divisible if both the
upper bound on money holdings and the total number of money units are doubled. The
paper is also related to all search models of money that discuss the e!ciency of monetary
exchange at some point. As far as we know, however, our paper is the !rst one that makes a
comparison across the di"erent types of models. Finally, Jafarey and Masters (2000) study
a random-matching model of indivisible money where agents have idiosyncratic preferences
for each others’ goods. They !nd similar ine!ciencies to ours. However, they concentrate
on di"erent issues from the ones we treat.
Section 2 presents the assumptions shared by the di"erent models used in this paper.
Section 3 introduces the mismatch problem into the indivisible money models. Section 4
studies the divisible goods and divisible money model, Section 5 shows how the divisibility
4Note also, that in contrast to Shi’s (1997, 1999) framework, in our model the velocity of money is
endogenous and strictly increasing in the rate of in"ation.
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of money a"ects the Pareto frontier of the bargaining set, and Section 6 concludes.
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The economy consists of a continuum of in!nitly lived households of measure one, denoted
by C, that specialize in consumption and production. There are " " ! types of goods and "
types of households. Households are uniformly distributed among types, so that the measure
of households of some given type # is $ # !
!
. For each type of good, there is a continuum
of varieties represented by a circle of circumference 2 denoted by C". Household % $ C"
produces the variety % of type #, and it derives utility from consuming all varieties of type
#" 1 (mod "). Because each household can be identi!ed by the good it produces, we have
C $ ""!{!#$$$#!} C". Denote by & the set of feasible quantities that a household can produce.
We will consider two cases: the indivisible goods model, where & $ $0' 1%, and the divisible
goods model, where & $ &".
The mismatch problem is similar to that of Kiyotaki and Wright (1991). The most
preferred variety of household % $ C" is %" chosen at random on C""! (mod "). If we draw at
random a variety ( from C""!, the length ) of the arc between %" and ( is uniformly distributed
on &0' 1'. Accordingly, if household % consumes only varieties within distance ) of its most
preferred variety %", the probability that a randomly chosen variety will be consumed by the
household is ).
The function mapping the distance between the variety that is consumed and the most
preferred variety, ), and the quantity consumed, *, into utility is continuous in both argu-
ments, strictly decreasing in ), and increasing in *. We adopt the following function:5
'()' *) $ ! ()) +(*)
where ! is strictly decreasing and twice di"erentiable, and satis!es ! (0) $ !sup and ! (1) $ 0.
Furthermore, we assume that + is increasing and twice di"erentiable, and satis!es + (0) $ 0,
+ (1) $ , , +00 ! 0, and +0 (0) $ %. The probability that ! is less than - $ &0' !sup' for a
variety chosen at random is equal to
P &! ()) & -' $ P #) " !#!(-)$ $ 1' !#!(-) # . (-)
where . (/) is a cumulative distribution with density 0 . Note that our assumptions on
preferences and production rule out barter trades.6
5Note that the analysis would hold for any utility function satisfying !#(l"q)!q ! !,
!#(l"q)
!l " !,
!!#(l"q)
!q! "
!, and !
!#(l"q)
!q!l " !.
6In Berentsen and Rocheteau (2000) we study a related environment where in each meeting there is a
double coincidence of real wants.
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A producer receives disutility 1 (*) from producing * units of a good. For the divisible
goods model, we will assume that 1 (*) $ *. For the indivisible goods model, let 1 (1) $ 2
with 2 ! !sup, . Goods cannot be stored, and production is instantaneous. Finally, the
discount factor is " $ !
!"%
with 3 4 0.
In addition to the consumption goods described above there is an intrinsically worthless,
storable object called !at money. We will again consider two cases: the indivisible money
model, where each household consists of one individual, and the divisible money model,
where each household consists of a continuum of members. For the indivisible money model,
a fraction 5 $ (0' 1) of all agents are initially endowed with one unit of money and each
agent has a single unit storage capacity. For the divisible money model, each household is
initially endowed with 6 units of divisible money and the household evenly distributes this
amount among a fraction 5 of its members. In both models, therefore, the fraction of agents
in the market endowed with money is exogenous and equal to 5 , and the fraction of agents
without money is 1'5 . We call agents with money buyers, and agents without sellers. A
buyer attempts to exchange money for consumption goods, and a seller attempts to produce
goods for money.
Buyers and sellers meet pairwise and at random. Our assumptions about technology and
preferences rule out meetings with double coincidence of real wants. Moreover, buyers only
buy varieties that lie in the set 7 ( &0' !sup', which is determined endogenously. Conse-
quently, for a buyer of type # who is matched to a seller, the probability of a successful trade
is $
%
&
8. (-), where $ $ !
!
is the probability that the seller is of type #" 1, and
%
&
8. (-)
is the probability that he produces a variety in 7.
Throughout the paper we assume that in a match the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-
it o"er and the seller accepts the o"er if made no worse o" by accepting. We adopt this
simplifying assumption because in Appendix B we show that our results also hold when the
terms of trade are determined through general Nash bargaining.
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The aim of this section is to identify the ine!ciencies that are present in indivisible money
models. For this purpose we introduce the same mismatch problem in the indivisible money
and indivisible goods model of Kiyotaki and Wright (1991, 1993) and the indivisible money
and divisible goods model of Shi (1995) and Trejos andWright (1995). We will also study the
outcome in these models when agents are allowed to use lotteries on money to determine the
terms of trades. Like the study of the divisible money model in Section 4, analyzing lotteries
on money will be useful for identifying the origin of the ine!ciencies in search models of
5
money.
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Time is continuous, agents cannot hold more than one object at a time, and the terms of
trades are exogenous: one unit of money buys one indivisible commodity. Only individuals
without money (sellers) are willing to produce.7 Buyers and sellers meet randomly according
to a Poisson process with arrival rate normalized to one. Thus, the probability per unit time
that a buyer of type # meets a seller of type #"1 is $ (1'5), and the probability per unit
time that a seller of type # meets a buyer of type #' 1 is $5 .
To introduce a notion of in"ation, we assume that a buyer’s indivisible unit of money is
con!scated at rate µ, and that sellers receive one unit of money at rate # $ '(
!#( .
8 Conse-
quently, the quantity of money is constant and equal to 5 . The value function of buyers
satis!es the following Bellman equation:
3:) $ $ (1'5)
& !sup
&
ma, (!, " :* ' :)' 0) 8. (!)' µ (:) ' :*) (1)
The "ow return to a buyer, 3:), equals the sum of two terms. The !rst term is the rate at
which the buyer meets appropriate sellers, $ (1'5), times the expected gain of a match,
which equals
% !sup
&
ma, (!, " :* ' :)' 0) 8. (!). In a single-coincidence meeting, either the
buyer spends his unit of money, which yields !, " :* ' :), or he remains a buyer, which
yields no surplus. The second term is the rate at which a buyer’s money is con!scated, µ,
times the con!scation loss, :) ' :*.
Because a buyer’s utility is increasing in !, the set of acceptable varieties is 7 $ &!' !sup',
where ! is a reservation value for the taste index that satis!es
!, $ :) ' :* (2)
If ! " !, the buyer is willing to buy the variety. Denote by ; the reservation value for
the average buyer. The probability that a variety of good # " 1 is accepted by a buyer of
type # chosen at random is 1' . (;). Accordingly, the value functions of sellers satisfy the
following Bellman equation:
3:* $ $5
#
1' . (;)$ ('2 " :) ' :*) " # (:) ' :*) (3)
7Buyers never produce, because they cannot hold more than one unit of money, and because there are
no barter meetings.
8This mechanism was introduced by Li (1995). It is a proxy for in"ation, because it reduces the real
value of money, and because the probability that the money is con!scated is proportional to the length of
time that the buyer holds the money.
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The "ow return to a seller, 3:*, equals the sum of two terms. The !rst term is the rate at
which the seller of type # meets a buyer of type # ' 1, $5 , times the probability that the
buyer accepts the trade, 1 ' . (;), times the expected gain from trading, producing, and
becoming a buyer, '2 " :) ' :*. The second term is the rate at which the seller receives
a unit of money, #, times the gain of becoming a buyer, :) ' :*.
Existence of a monetary equilibrium requires that sellers be willing to produce for money:
:) ' :* " 2. (4)
In the following we only consider symmetric Nash equilibria, where ! $ ;.
4%!"(#(*" 1 5or the indivisible goods and indivisible money model7 a monetary equilibrium
is a triplet (:)' :*' !) that satis!es equations 91;<93; and participation constraint 94;.
To compare the outcome of the decentralized economy with the allocation that a planner
would choose in order to maximize welfare, consider the following ex ante Pareto criterion:
< $ 3 (5:) " (1'5):*). Welfare is the expected permanent income of a single agent
before money is distributed. Equations (1) and (3) yield
< $ $5(1'5)
& !sup
!
&!, ' 2' 8. (!)
Welfare is maximized at !" $ 2=, . From a social point of view buyers should accept any
trade with a positive surplus (!, ' 2 " 0), because for the society it does not matter who
holds the money.
Pr*D*6(#(*" 1 Consider the model with indivisible goods and indivisible money. Then7
there exists a critical value !&7 de!ned in the proof7 such that the following is trueD
9i; If 2=, 4 !&7 no monetary equilibrium exist.
9ii; If 2=, & !&7 there exists a monetary equilibrium.
5urthermore7 +
,
! !& ) ! 4 2=, .
Proposition 1 establishes the existence of a monetary equilibrium in the indivisible goods
and indivisible money model if the ratio 2=, is below the critical value !&. The critical value
!& is decreasing in the in"ation rate µ, in the rate 3 of time preference, and in the measure
5 of buyers.
The key result is that the frequency of trades is generically too low (! 4 2=,). If
! $ &2=,' !), agents do not trade even though it would be socially e!cient to trade. Buyers
are too choosy; they fail to internalize the positive e"ect of spending money on other market
participants. Indeed, a buyer’s private gain from a successful trade is !, ":*':), whereas
7
the social gain is !, ' 2. The private gain and the social gain coincide if and only if
:) ' :* $ 2. Thus, this condition is satis!ed when sellers are just indi"erent between
accepting and refusing money, which only happens when !& $ +, .
One can remove the no-trade ine!ciency by choosing a su!ciently high in"ation rate.
In Appendix A1 we show that a higher in"ation rate reduces the reservation value, because
waiting for a better trading opportunity becomes more costly. This is the “hot potato”
e"ect of in"ation mentioned by Li (1995). The welfare-maximizing in"ation is the value of µ
satisfying ! $ 2=, : it is the maximum level that does not destroy the monetary equilibrium.
Finally, as shown in the Appendix, equations (1), (2), and (3) implicitly de!ne a reaction
function ! $ &(;), which is increasing in ; if 2=, ! !&. This illustrates the presence of
strategic complementarities: the best response of a single agent is to increase his reservation
value if all other agents increase theirs. Consequently, multiple equilibria may occur.
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We now allow agents to use lotteries on money to determine the terms of trade.9 Bargaining
over lotteries on money means bargaining over the probability $ ! that the unit of money
changes hands. We again restrict our attention to take-it-or-leave-it o"ers (for the generalized
Nash solution, see Appendix B1). With lotteries on money, the value functions of buyers
and sellers satisfy the following generalized versions of (1) and (3):
3:) $ $ (1'5)
& !sup
!
&!, ' $ ! (:) ' :*)' 8. (!)' µ (:) ' :*) (5)
3:* $ $5
& !sup
-
&'2 " $ ! (:) ' :*)' 8. (!) " # (:) ' :*) (6)
When a buyer meets an appropriate seller, the buyer receives the good and delivers his unit of
money with probability $ !. Thus, his expected surplus from the trade is !, ' $ ! (:) ' :*).
Because buyers make take-it-or-leave-it o"ers, we have '2 " $ ! (:) ' :*) $ 0 for all !.
Consequently, the probability that money changes hands is constant and equal to
$ ! $ $ # 2
:) ' :* *! $ &!' !sup' (7)
Existence of a monetary equilibrium requires that $ be not larger than one, i.e., that the
seller’s participation constraint (4) be satis!ed. Because a buyer’s surplus is increasing in !,
buyers trade if and only if ! " !, where ! is a reservation value that satis!es
!, ' $ (:) ' :*) $ 0 (8)
9In contrast to Berentsen et al. (2000), we only consider lotteries on money, because this allows us to
introduce a notion of divisible money without a"ecting the indivisibility of goods.
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4%!"(#(*" 2 5or the indivisible goods and indivisible money model with lotteries on money7
a monetary equilibrium is a list (:)' :*' !' $) satisfying equations 95;<9G; and $ & 1.
From (5) and (6), welfare is maximized if ! $ +
,
. Note that $ is irrelevant: For the
society it does not matter how often money changes hands.
Pr*D*6(#(*" 2 Consider the model with indivisible goods7 indivisible money7 and lotteries.
Then there is a critical value !&7 de!ned in the proof7 such that the following is trueD
9i; If 2=, 4 !&7 no monetary equilibrium exists.
9ii; If 2=, & !&7 a unique monetary equilibrium exists with ! $ +, .
The probability that the unit of money changes hands is
$ ! $ $ $
(3 " µ" #)2=,
$ (1'5) % !sup
+.,
&1' . (!)' 8! if ! $ &2=,' !sup'
$ ! $ 0 if ! ! 2=,
The key result is that the monetary equilibrium is e!cient, because whenever there is a
positive surplus in a match, the buyer proposes an o"er that exploits the entire surplus and
this o"er is not refused by the seller.10 Accordingly, the frequency of trades is at its e!cient
level, i.e., ! $ +
,
. Moreover, lotteries on money remove the strategic complementarities
that are present without lotteries, and hence the possibility of multiple equilibria. Also, in
contrast to the model without lotteries, in"ation has no welfare-improving role, because it
cannot increase the frequency of trades. Rather, in"ation is detrimental, because it decreases
the critical value !& and therefore makes the existence of a monetary equilibrium less likely.
Note that the model with lotteries and the same model without lotteries have the same
critical value !&.
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In this subsection we explore how the mismatch problem a"ects the outcome when the
terms of trade are endogenized along the lines of Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995).
Suppose, therefore, that goods are divisible but money is still indivisible, and that buyers
make a take-it-or-leave-it o"er to the seller about the quantity that the seller has to produce
for one unit of money. Let *! be the amount produced by a seller in exchange for one unit
of money when the buyer’s valuation for the good is !+(*!). Expected lifetime utilities of
10Appendix B1 shows that e!ciency is also attained when the terms of trade are determined through
generalized Nash bargaining.
9
buyers and sellers obey the following Bellman equations in continuous time:
3:) $ $ (1'5)
& !sup
&
ma, &!+ (*!) " :* ' :)' 0' 8. (!) " µ (:* ' :)) (9)
3:* $ $5
&
&
&'*! " :) ' :*' 8. (!) " # (:) ' :*) (10)
where 7 ( &0' !sup' is the set of varieties that money holders are willing to buy. Equations
(9) and (10) have similar interpretations to equations (1) and (3). The main di"erence is
that the !rst term of the right-hand side of (10) is zero, because sellers do not get any bene!t
from trading with buyers. This is a consequence of the take-it-or-leave-it o"ers that satisfy
*! $ * # :) ' :* *! $ 7 (11)
Because buyers extract all the surplus from the match, and because the surplus of the seller
does not depend on the quality of the match, the terms of trade do not depend on the taste
index !.
The surplus of the buyer, !+(*)":*':), is increasing in !. Consequently, the reservation
property holds, and the set of acceptable varieties is 7 $ &!' !sup', where the reservation value
! satis!es
!+ (*) $ * # :) ' :* (12)
4%!"(#(*" 3 5or the divisible goods and indivisible money model7 a monetary equilibrium
is a list (:)' :*' !' *) that satis!es equations 9H;<912; and * 4 0.
Again, we compare the outcome of the decentralized economy with the allocation that
a social planner would choose in order to maximize social welfare. Equations (9) and (10)
imply that welfare equals
< $ $ (1'5)5
& !sup
!
&!+ (*!)' *!' 8. (!)
By maximizing < with respect to ! and *!, we !nd that the !rst-best allocation satis!es
! $ 0
!+0 (*!) $ 1 *! $ &0' !sup'
The !rst equation states that buyers of type # should consume all varieties of type # " 1.
The second equation states that the quantity produced, exchanged, and consumed should
equalize the marginal utility of the buyer to the marginal cost of the seller. Denote e!cient
quantities by *"! .
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Pr*D*6(#(*" 3 Consider the model with divisible goods and indivisible money. Then a
unique monetary equilibrium exists with ! $ (0' !sup). 5urthermore7 there is a critical value!/ 4 ! such that the following is trueD
9i; If ! ! !7 no trade taJes place.
9ii; If ! $ &!'!/)7 the quantity exchanged is too high.
9iii; If ! 4 !/7 the quantity exchanged is too low.
Moreover7 if 3 4 3&7 where 3& is de!ned in the proof7 then !/ ! !sup.
Proposition 3 establishes the existence of a unique monetary equilibrium, which is gener-
ically ine!cient. There are three types of ine!ciencies. First, if ! ! !, no goods are
exchanged. Second, if ! & ! ! !/ , the quantities exchanged are ine!ciently high (prices
are too low). Third, if ! 4 !/ , the quantities exchanged are ine!ciently low (prices are too
high). These ine!ciencies occur simultaneously if 3 4 3&, where 3& is negative if µ is large.
They are displayed in Figure 1(a), where the curve labelled *"! displays e!cient quantities
and the curve labelled *! exchanged quantities as functions of !.
!
Too-little-trade Too-much-trade No-trade 
I!
~! sup!
 
(a) Without lotteries 
1
!
SB $$ "  
Too-little-trade 
L!
~
 sup!
(b) With lotteries 
Figure 1. Terms of trade and ine!ciencies.
To explain the no-trade and too-much-trade ine!ciencies, consider a buyer’s consumption
decision when the seller produces a variety in a neighborhood of ! (see Figure 1(a)). If ! $ !,
the buyer is just indi"erent between consuming * units of the good and becoming a seller and
remaining a buyer. The seller is also indi"erent between producing * units and becoming a
buyer and remaining a seller. If ! is slightly below !, no trade takes place, because the bid
price of money is smaller than the ask price of money.11 In contrast, if ! is slightly above !,
11The bid price of money is the quantity the seller is willing to produce for one unit of money, and the
ask price of money is what the buyer demands to give it up (see Wallace (1997)).
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then the bid price of money is larger than its ask price and, because of the buyer-takes-all
bargaining protocol, a trade takes place at the bid price. The consumed quantity, however,
is ine!ciently large because of the buyer’s low valuation of the variety.
In the indivisible goods model of Section 3.1, an increase of the in"ation rate increases
the frequency of trades and welfare by lowering the reservation value !. In the divisible goods
model of this subsection, this extensive e"ect of in"ation is also present. In contrast to the
indivisible goods model, however, in"ation has also an intensive e"ect, i.e., an increase in the
in"ation rate reduces the quantities exchanged in each match. In Figure 1, if the in"ation
rate increases, * is reduced (the intensive e"ect) and the reservation value ! moves to the
left (the extensive e"ect).
Finally, we want to emphasize that none of these ine!ciencies are generated by the
assumption of take-it-or-leave-it o"ers by buyers. Rather, they are a general property of
indivisible money models.12 In particular, it will be shown below that the too-much-trade
ine!ciency is not a consequence of the high bargaining power of buyers as the take-it-or-
leave-it-o"er might suggest. Indeed, with lotteries on money this ine!ciency vanishes even
when the buyer has all the bargaining power.
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We now allow agents to use lotteries on money to determine the terms of trade.13 We restrict
our attention to take-it-or-leave-it o"ers (*!' $ !), where *! is the amount of goods that the
seller produces in an !-meeting and $ ! is the probability that the unit of money changes
hands. Note that we do not need to introduce a reservation value for the taste index in this
model, because if a buyer does not want to trade, he can propose $ ! $ 0.
With lotteries on money, the expected lifetime utilities of buyers and sellers satisfy
3:) $ $ (1'5)
& !sup
&
&!+ (*!)' $ ! (:) ' :*)' 8. (!) " µ (:* ' :)) (13)
3:* $ $5
& !sup
&
&'*! " $ ! (:) ' :*)' 8. (!) " # (:) ' :*) (14)
Under buyer-takes-all bargaining, the !rst term of the right-hand side of (14) is equal to
12In Appendix B2, we show that these ine!ciencies are also present when the bargaining proceeds according
to the generalized Nash bargaining solution. The main di"erence is that #" is not constant but a strictly
decreasing function of !.
13We only consider lotteries on money because we want to focus on the consequences of the indivisibility
of money without a"ecting how goods are traded. However, allowing agents to also use lotteries on goods
would not change our results at all. Indeed, Berentsen et al. (2000) have shown that in equilibrium goods
always change hands with probability ". Appendix B3 shows that the results presented here also hold if the
terms of trade are determined by the generalized Nash bargaining solution.
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zero, because the take-it-or-leave-it o"ers satisfy
$ ! (:) ' :*) $ *! *! $ &0' !sup' (15)
For a given realization of the taste index !, the buyer solves
ma,
0!#"!
!+ (*!)' $ ! (:) ' :*) (16)
subject to (15) and
$ ! & 1 *! $ &0' !sup' (17)
4%!"(#(*" E 5or the divisible goods and indivisible money model with lotteries on money7
a monetary equilibrium is a list (:)' :*' *!' $ !) such that the value functions satisfy 913; and
914; taJing the lottery as givenL the lottery solves the maximiMation problem in 916; taJing
the value functions as givenL and :) ' :* 4 0.
As in the model without lotteries, e!ciency requires that *! satisfy !+0(*!) $ 1 for all
! $ &0' !sup'. Denote e!cient quantities by *"! .
Pr*D*6(#(*" E Consider the model with divisible goods7 indivisible money7 and lotteries on
money. Then7 there is a unique monetary equilibrium with !1 4 0 such thatD
9i; If ! 4 !17 then *! $ (0' *"!) and $ ! $ 1.
9ii; If ! & !17 then *! $ *"! and $ ! & 1.
5urthermore7 if 3 & 3!7 where 3! is de!ned in the proof7 then !1 " !sup.
The key result is that 0 ! *! & *"! for all ! 4 0. That is, the quantities exchanged are
never larger than the e!cient quantities, and the frequency of trades is at its e!cient level.
This result suggests that the no-trade and the too-much-trade ine!ciencies are due to the
indivisibility of money.
The results of Proposition 4 are displayed in Figure 1(b). In the upper quadrant of Figure
1(b), the dashed curve labelled *"! plots e!cient quantities as a function of !, and the solid
curve labelled *! displays the quantities that are exchanged in equilibrium. If ! ! !1, the
two curves merge and the traders exchange e!cient quantities. The lower quadrant plots
the probability that money changes hands, $ !, as a function of the taste index.
With lotteries in"ation has only an intensive e"ect (#0!
#'
! 0 if ! ! !). In Figure 1(b),
if µ increases, the "at part of the *! curve shortens and !1 moves to the left. Notice that
all trades are e!cient if 3 & 3!. If µ $ # $ 0, then 3 & 3! is satis!ed for 3 close to 0.
Thus, if the traders are patient and in"ation is low, they trade e!cient quantities in all
meetings. In contrast, if µ is large, the too-little-trade ine!ciency does not vanish, even
when 3 approaches zero (i.e., 3! is negative).
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Pr*D*6(#(*" F The measure of trades where the quantities produced are ine!ciently low is
smaller with lotteries than without7 that is7 !1 4 !/. Moreover7 the value of money (:)':*)
is higher when lotteries are allowed.
According to Proposition 5, lotteries reduce the set of matches where the quantities
exchanged are ine!ciently low. The reason for this result is that money is more valuable
with lotteries than without (i.e., :) ' :* is larger), which implies that sellers are willing to
produce more for it.
E 4(5(6(78% A*"%)
In the indivisible money model, the frequency of trades is too low, because buyers are too
choosy. In the divisible goods and indivisible money model, there are ine!ciencies associated
with no trade, too little trade, and too much trade. What lies behind these ine!ciencies?
The analysis of lotteries in Section 3 has suggested that the reason for the no-trade and
too-much-trade ine!ciencies is the indivisibility of money. To explore this conjecture further,
we analyze the same mismatch problem in the divisible money and divisible goods model of
Shi (1999).
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Most of the description of the environment presented in Section 2 applies to the divisible
money environment. The main di"erences are that time is discrete, and that each household
consists of a continuum of members normalized to one who carry out di"erent tasks but
regard the household’s utility as the common objective. When carrying out these tasks,
household members follow the strategy that has been given to them by their households.
At the end of each period, they pool their money holdings, which eliminates aggregate
uncertainty for households. In the symmetric monetary equilibrium, the distribution of
money holdings is degenerate across households. This facilitates the analysis, because we
can focus on a representative household.14 Finally, the utility of the household is de!ned as
the sum of the utilities of its members.15
14The large household assumption, extending a similar one in Lucas (1990), avoids di!culties that arise
in models with a nondegenerate distribution of money holdings, and so allows for a tractable analysis of
in"ation. In search models of money, it was !rst used by Shi (1997, 1999, 2001). See also Berentsen
and Rocheteau (2000, 2001). Lagos and Wright (2001) investigate an alternative assumption that yields a
degenerate distribution of money holdings in random-matching models of money.
15We have also introduced the large household in the indivisible money and indivisible goods model of
Kiyotaki and Wright (1991, 1993) and the indivisible money and divisible goods model of Trejos and Wright
(1995) and Shi (1995). Interestingly, we have found exactly the same reduced form equations as in the
14
Household members are grouped into money holders (buyers) and producers (sellers).
Buyers attempt to exchange money for consumption goods, and sellers attempt to produce
goods for money. The fraction of buyers is given by the exogenous constant 5 . In each
period, each household member meets at random a member from another household. Hence,
the probability that a seller of type # meets a buyer of type #' 1 is $5 , and the probability
that a buyer of type # meets a seller of type #" 1 is $ (1'5).
Although households di"er in their preferences and production opportunities, they all
consume and produce the same quantities, so that each household can be treated symmetri-
cally. In the following we refer to an arbitrary household as household %. Decision variables
of this household are denoted by lowercase letters. Capital letters denote other households’
variables, which are taken as given by the representative household %. Because we focus
on steady state equilibria, we omit the time index >. Nevertheless, variables corresponding
to the next period are indexed by +1, and those corresponding to the previous period are
indexed by '1.
The chronology of events within a period is as follows. At the beginning of each period,
household % has? units of money, which it divides evenly among its buyers so that each buyer
holds ?=5 units of money in a match. Within a period, no buyer can transfer money to
another member of the same household. Then, the household speci!es the trading strategies
for its members. After this, agents are matched and carry out their exchanges according to
the prescribed strategies. After trading, buyers consume the acquired goods, and sellers bring
back their receipts of money.16 At the end of a period, the household receives a lump-sum
money transfer $ , which can be negative, and carries the stock ?"! to >" 1.
The quantity of money in the economy is assumed to grow at the gross growth rate %. We
restrict % to be larger than the discount factor ".17 The (indirect) marginal utility of money
of the household % is & $ ": 0(?"!), where : (?) is the steady-state lifetime discounted
utility of a household holding ? units of money.
As in the previous section, we assume that the terms of trade are determined through
take-it-or-leave-it o"ers by buyers. When matched, household members observe the match
type but cannot observe the marginal value of money of their trading partners.18 As a
consequence, households’ strategies depend on the match type and on the distribution of their
original models (a proof of this claim is available by request).
16In contrast to Shi (1999), we assume that at the beginning of each period the $ buyers are chosen at
random among household’s members and that each buyer consumes immediately the goods he has acquired
in the market.
17This condition guarantees the existence of a unique steady-state monetary equilibrium.
18As in Shi (1999), but in contrast to Rauch (2000), buyers’ strategies do not depend on the speci!c
characteristics of the sellers they meet; rather they depend on the average characteristics of sellers. For a
discussion of this assumption see Berentsen and Rocheteau (2001).
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potential bargaining partners’ characteristics. In equilibrium, this distribution is degenerate:
all households have the same marginal value of money.
A buyer’s take-it-or-leave-it o"er is a pair (*!' -!), where *! is the quantity of goods
produced by the seller for -! units of money. If the seller accepts the o"er, the acquired
money -! will add to his household’s money balances at the beginning of the next period.
Because each seller is atomistic, the amount of money obtained by a seller is valued at the
marginal utility of money, !.19 The cost associated with this trade is *!, and the seller
accepts the o"er if -!! " *!. Thus, any optimal o"er satis!es
-!! $ *! *! $ &0' !sup' (18)
Because a buyer cannot exchange more money than he has, the o"er (*!' -!) satis!es
-! & ?
5
*! $ &0' !sup' (19)
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A household’s trading strategy consists of the terms of trade (*!' -!) for all ! $ &0' !sup',
and an acceptance rule for each o"er (&!'X!) from a buyer of another household. Buyers
of other households make o"ers that satisfy a condition similar to (18). Consequently, such
o"ers are accepted by sellers of household %. As in the lottery models of Section 3, there is
no need to introduce a reservation value !, because the household can always set -! $ 0 if
he does not want to trade.
For each period, the household chooses ?"! and the terms of trade (*!' -!) for all ! $
&0' !sup' to solve the following dynamic programming problem:
: (?) $ ma,
0!#2!#3+1
'
$5(1'5)
(& !sup
&
!+ (*!) 8. (!)'
& !sup
&
&!8. (!)
)
" ": (?"!)
*
(20)
subject to the constraints (18), (19), and
?"! '? $ $ " $(1'5)5
& !sup
&
X!8. (!)' $(1'5)5
& !sup
&
-!8. (!) (21)
19To see why, suppose that the measure of a member is µ. Then for the household, the value of & additional
units of money received by a member is " #' $(+1 % &µ&' ' $(+1&'. To express the value of & additional
units of money for a member, we must multiply this quantity by the scale factor 1$ . Because members are
atomistic, we let µ+ ! to get
()*
$"0
"
#' $(+1 % &µ&' ' $(+1&'
µ
+ &"' 0$(+1& + &#
Thus, from the point of view of the household &# is a member’s indirect utility of receiving & units of money
in a match.
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The variables taken as given in the above problem are the state variable ? and other house-
holds’ choices. The !rst term between braces in (20) speci!es the consumption utility of the
household de!ned as the sum of utilities of all its members (there is no aggregate uncertainty
at the household level). The measure of buyers is5 , and the probability of meeting an appro-
priate seller is $ (1'5), so that the number of single-coincidence meetings involving a buyer
in each period is $5(1'5). Accordingly, aggregate utility is $5(1'5) % !sup
&
!+ (*!) 8. (!).
The second term speci!es the household’s disutility of production.
Equality (21) describes the law of motion of the household’s money balances. The !rst
term on the right-hand side speci!es the additional currency the household receives each
period. The second term speci!es sellers’ money receipts when selling goods, and the third
term speci!es buyers’ expenses when exchanging money for goods.
Denote by '! the multipliers associated with constraints (19). Note that these constraints
are applicable only when buyers are involved in single-coincidence meetings, which occurs
with probability $(1 ' 5). Note further that, according to (18), -! can be expressed as a
function of *!. The !rst-order conditions and the envelope condition are
!+0(*!) $
1
!
('! " &) *! $ &0' !sup' (22)
'!
+
-! ' ?
5
,
$ 0 *! $ &0' !sup' (23)
&#!
"
$ $(1'5)
& !sup
&
'!8. (!) " & (24)
Equation (22) states that, for a buyer in a desirable match, the marginal utility of consump-
tion must equal the opportunity cost of the amount of money that must be paid to acquire
additional goods. To buy another unit of a good, the buyer must give up !
!
units of money
(see equation (18)). Increasing the monetary payment has two costs to the buyer. He gives
up the future value of money &, and he faces a tighter constraint (19). Together, & and '
measure the marginal cost of obtaining a larger quantity of goods in exchange for money.
Equation (23) is the Kuhn-Tucker condition associated with the multiplier '!. Finally, equa-
tion (24) describes the evolution of the marginal value of money. It states that the marginal
value of money today, $!1
%
, equals the discounted marginal value of money tomorrow, &, plus
the marginal bene!t of relaxing future cash constraints, $(1'5) % !sup
&
'!8. (!).
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In equilibrium, all households have the same characteristics, which implies that the values
for the di"erent variables of household % equal the values of the same variables of all other
households. Consequently, capital variables and lowercase variables are equal: & $ !,
? $ 6 , and (-!' *!) $ (X!' &!) for all ! $ &0' !sup'.
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4%!"(#(*" F A steady-state monetary equilibrium is a collection $(*!) ' ('!) ' (-!) '?&% sat-
isfying equations 91G; and 922;<924;7 and ?& 4 0.
As in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, e!ciency requires that the quantities exchanged equalize the
marginal utility of the buyer to the marginal cost of the seller. Denote e!cient quantities
by *"! .
Pr*D*6(#(*" I Consider the divisible goods and divisible money model. Then there is a
unique monetary equilibrium with &? 4 0. 5urthermore7 there is a critical value !4 & !sup
such that the following is trueD
9i; If ! 4 !47 buyers spend all their money holdings and *! $ &5( ! *"! .
9ii; If ! & !47 buyers spend only a fraction of their money holdings and *! $ *"! .
Moreover7 when % tends to " then !4 approaches !sup.
The key result is that with divisible money we have *! $ (0' *"! ' for all ! $ (0' !sup': the
quantities exchanged are never larger than the e!cient quantity, and households consume
all varieties. With divisible money, a household simply spends a small amount of money
to acquire a small amount of a low-valued variety. Thus, like lotteries, divisible money
eliminates the no-trade and the too-much-trade ine!ciencies that are present when money
is indivisible. The only ine!ciency left is the too-little-trade ine!ciency that occurs if
! 4 !4. This ine!ciency, however, vanishes under the Friedman rule % + ".20
Figure 2: Terms of trade with divisible money.
20The too-little-trade ine!ciency may remain under the Friedman rule if buyers do not have all the
bargaining power and if sellers can condition their bargaining strategy on the speci!c level of money holdings
of their partner in the match. This issue is discussed in Berentsen and Rocheteau (2001).
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Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 6. The upper quadrant displays the e!cient quantity *"!
and the exchanged quantity *! as a function of the taste index !. If in a match we have ! &!4, then *! $ *"! , that is, the buyer and the seller produce and consume e!cient quantities.
If ! 4 !4, however, then *! ! *"! , that is, the quantities exchanged are ine!ciently low. The
lower quadrant shows the exchanged quantities of money -! as a function of !. If ! & !4,
then -! & 6=5 , that is, the buyer does not spend all his money. If ! 4 !4, however,
-! $ 6=5 .
One virtue of our model is that it makes the divisibility of money visible: for low-valued
varieties buyers spend only a fraction of their money holdings to acquire an e!cient quantity
of the good. In contrast, in Shi’s (1997, 1999) model buyers always spend their entire money
holdings and they always exchange ine!ciently low quantities. Moreover, in our framework,
in contrast to Shi’s (1997, 1999) model, the velocity of money depends on the growth rate
of the money supply. In the Appendix A6 we show that the velocity of money is increasing
in the rate of in"ation. This result arises, because in"ation reduces the real value of money
(&6). Consequently, the buyers whose constraints on money holdings are not binding must
spend a larger fraction of their money holdings to buy the e!cient quantity of goods.
Note also that with divisible money, in"ation has no positive “hot potato” e"ect on
welfare, because it cannot increase the frequency of trades. In contrast, in"ation is always
costly, because it generates a misallocation of resources.21 A higher rate of the money supply
increases the misallocation, because it reduces the set of meetings where agents produce and
exchange e!cient quantities. To see this, note that in Figure 2, the horizontal line $5
(
moves
upwards when % decreases. Consequently, the fraction of ine!cient trades decreases. In the
limit when % approaches ", almost all trades are e!cient, i.e., !4 approaches !sup.
Note that the model can be reduced to the two following equations that determine *!
and & simultaneously:
*! $ min
(
*"! '
&6
5
)
(25)
&#! $ "$(1'5)
& !sup
&
ma, (!+0(*!)&'&) 8. (!) " " &1' $(1'5)'& (26)
Hence, the model has a very simple structure. Equation (25) states that a buyer consumes
the e!cient quantity unless his money holdings are too small to compensate the seller for
the production cost. Equation (26), which is derived from the envelope condition, can be
interpreted as a standard asset pricing equation. For the household, the value of an additional
unit of money received at the end of the previous period is &#!. In the current period, this
21With search externalities a departure from the Friedman rule can be a second-best solution (Berentsen,
Rocheteau, and Shi (2001)).
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unit of money can be either spent or saved. If it is saved, its value from the point of view
of the previous period is simply "&. If it is spent in an !-meeting, the additional utility of
consumption is !+0(*!)&. Indeed, from equation (18), one additional unit of money buys &
units of real commodity, where each unit provides !+0(*!) additional utility. Accordingly,
an additional unit of money is spent if and only if a buyer meets a seller with probability
$(1 ' 5) and if the marginal utility of consumption is larger than the marginal value of
money, that is, if !6+0(*7!)& 4 &.
Finally, we want to emphasize the similarity of the results of the indivisible money,
divisible goods, and lottery model of Section 3 and the divisible money model of this section.
This similarity is revealed when comparing Propositions 4 and 6, corresponding respectively
to Figures 1b and 2. In both models, there is a threshold !6, where % $ A'B, such that for
all ! & !6 the quantities exchanged are socially e!cient, whereas for all ! 4 !6 the quantities
produced are too low. Moreover, if ! 4 !4 (! 4 !1), buyers spend all their money holdings
(they spend the indivisible unit of money with probability one). Also, if ! & !4 (! & !1),
buyers spend a fraction of their money holdings (they spend the indivisible unit of money
with probability $ ! 1).
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To explain further the ine!ciencies that arise when money is indivisible, and to discuss the
role of lotteries to eliminate the too-much-trade and the no-trade ine!ciencies, we show
graphically how lotteries (or divisible money) a"ect the Pareto frontier of the bargaining set
and the outcome of the bargaining in the divisible goods model.
Consider a match where the taste index of the buyer is !. When bargaining, the buyer
and the seller take :) and :* as given. Let S) (S*) denote the surplus of the buyer (seller),
and let S" $ S) " S* be the total surplus of the match when the e!cient quantity *"! is
produced. Note that S" is the maximal total surplus that can be attained in this match,
and that the S"S" line in Figure 3 represents the possible divisions of S" between the two
players.
The Pareto frontiers of the bargaining sets without and with lotteries ()/ and )1) are
represented by the solid curves in Figure 3(a) and 3(b), respectively.22 Without lotteries,
the Pareto frontier is downward sloping and strictly concave, and it has an unique tangency
point with the S"S" line. With lotteries, the Pareto frontier coincides with the S"S" line
when S* ! :) ' :* ' *"! , and it is identical with the Pareto frontier of the model without
lotteries when S* 4 :) ' :* ' *"! .
22The expressions for the Pareto frontiers are obtained in Appendix A7.
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Figure 3 shows how a lottery on money expands the Pareto frontier of the bargaining set.
First, for all *! 4 *"! , a lottery moves the Pareto frontier upward, i.e., it allows agents to attain
a higher total surplus. To see why, note that if *! 4 *"! , the marginal utility of the buyer is
smaller than the marginal cost of the seller. Graphically, the absolute value of the slope of
the Pareto frontier is less than one. This overproduction is a social waste, which is removed
if we allow lotteries on money, because for all *! 4 *"! there is a lottery $ ! 1 such that
the seller produces *"! and still gets the same surplus as in the model without lottery. This
new allocation increases the surplus of the buyer unambiguously. Consequently, lotteries
on money permit traders to obtain a Pareto-superior outcome when *! 4 *"! . Note that
the origin of the overproduction in the model without lotteries is that production transfers
utility imperfectly. In contrast, when money is equally valued by the buyer and the seller,
a lottery on money or divisible money transfer utility perfectly. Graphically, the fact that
divisible money (or indivisible money with lotteries) transfers utility perfectly is illustrated
by the partially linear Pareto frontier in Figure 3b, whereas in Figure 3a the Pareto frontier
is strictly concave.23
Figure 3: Pareto frontier with and without lotteries.
Second, for all *! ! *"! , lotteries do not a"ect the Pareto frontier. In this case, the
marginal utility of the buyer is larger than the marginal cost of the seller. Graphically,
the absolute value of the slope of the Pareto frontier is larger than one. To correct this
23In models where the marginal value of money is not equal for all agents, money cannot transfer utility
perfectly (e.g., Berentsen (2000), Rocheteau (2000), and Zhou (1999)).
21
too-little-trade ine!ciency, the buyer must be endowed with more money. Finally, note that
increasing the value of money (:) ' :*) moves the point '*"! " :) ' :* to the right, which
increases the set of points of the Pareto frontier in the model with lotteries ()1) that lie on
the C"C" line.
Figure 3 makes clear that our results in Section 3 do not depend on the bargaining
protocol, because the bargaining power of the buyer a"ects the shape of the Nash product
curve, but not the Pareto frontier of the bargaining set.24
In Figure 4 we represent the bargaining solution without lotteries by a circle and the
solution with lotteries by a dot when there is the too-much-trade ine!ciency (Figure 4a),
the too-little-trade ine!ciency (Figure 4b), or the no-trade ine!ciency (Figure 4c). For
each case, under buyer-takes-all bargaining, the bargaining solution is at the point where
the Pareto frontier crosses the vertical axes (S* $ 0). In Figure 4a, which is a redraw of
Figure 3, lotteries correct the too-little-trade ine!ciency. In Figure 4b lotteries cannot solve
the too-little-trade ine!ciency, because the tangency point of the Pareto frontier with the
C"C" lies in the second quadrant. In contrast, in Figure 4c lotteries remove the no-trade
ine!ciency. For this ine!ciency, which arises for small values of !, the Pareto frontier is
situated below the horizontal axis, and there is no mutually bene!cial trade feasible without
lotteries. Introducing lotteries moves the Pareto frontier upward, and the part of the Pareto
frontier which is located in the !rst quadrant coincides with the S"S" line.
Figure 4: The three ine!ciencies.
24Recall that while bargaining the traders take the continuation payo"s 'B and 'S , and consequently the
value of money ('B ' 'S), as given. If we consider a general change in the bargaining protocol, the shape
of the Pareto frontier would change too, because this would a"ect 'B ' 'S .
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Divisible money enables us to distribute “value according to our varying requirements”
(Stanley Jevons, 1875). Despite the obvious advantage of having a divisible medium of
exchange in real exchanges, in most search models money is an indivisible object.25 The
goal of this paper has been to evaluate the consequences of this assumption.
Our main conclusion is that the indivisibility of money generates the no-trade and the
too-much-trade ine!ciencies. The reason why indivisible money generates these ine!ciencies
is intuitive. First, if a buyer’s valuation for a good is very low, then the ask price of money
(the quantity that makes the buyer indi"erent between trading and not trading) is larger
than the bid price of money (the quantity that makes the seller indi"erent). Consequently,
no trade takes place even though it would be socially e!cient to trade. This no-trade
ine!ciency disappears with divisible money (or with lotteries on indivisible money), because
if a buyer’s valuation for a good is low, he simply spends a small amount of divisible money
(or he delivers the indivisible money with probability less than one) in exchange for a small
(and e!cient) amount of the good.
Second, if the buyer’s valuation for the good is low but not too low, then the ask price
of money is smaller than the bid price. Consequently, an exchange takes place. However,
because of the buyer’s low valuation for the good, the exchanged quantity is larger than the
e!cient quantity (this is the too-much-trade ine!ciency). Like the no-trade ine!ciency, and
for the same reason, the too-much-trade ine!ciency disappears with divisible money or with
lotteries on indivisible money.
Finally, if the buyer’s valuation for the good is large, we observe in all models the too-
little-trade ine!ciency. The cause of this is that the buyer is constrained by his money
holdings. His constraint on money holdings is binding because the purchasing power of
money is too low, in turn because agents discount future utilities.
From a methodological perspective, our paper shows that the model with divisible goods,
indivisible money, and lotteries on money is qualitatively equivalent to the divisible goods
and divisible money model. In either model, the quantities exchanged are e!cient for low-
valuation goods and are ine!ciently low for high-valuation goods. Furthermore, when the
quantities exchanged are e!cient, the buyer only gives a fraction of his money holdings in
the divisible money model, or he delivers his money unit with a probability less than one in
the lottery model.
One conclusion of this paper is that an important condition for e!ciency in a monetary
economy is that the medium of exchange transfers utility perfectly (the exchanged object
25Exceptions are Green and Zhou (1998), Molico (1996), Shi (1997, 1999).
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must be equally valued by the two parties). In this sense, our analysis has complemented our
paper on money and terms of trade (Berentsen and Rocheteau, 2000), where we demonstrate
that barter trades are generically ine!cient if the traders have asymmetric preferences for
each others’ goods. In such an environment, divisible money improves the allocation through
its ability to transfer utility perfectly between agents.
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APPENDIX A: Proofs
:19 Pr**+ *+ Pr*D*6(#(*" 1
Money is accepted by sellers if condition (4) is satis!ed, which requires from (2) that ! " +
,
.
We will demonstrate that this condition is satis!ed if +
,
is smaller than some threshold !&.
@$% ("=(5(=>-8 '$*('% *+ !9 Equations (1), (2), and (3) implicitly de!ne a reaction
function ! $ &(;):
(3 " µ" #) !" $5
#
1' . (;)$ (!' 2=,) $ $(1'5)& !sup
!
&1' . (!)' 8! (27)
By di"erentiating (27), we !nd
&0(;) $ $50
-
;
. #&(;)' 2=,$
3 " µ" # " $5
#
1' . (;)$" $(1'5) #1' . -&(;).$ (28)
@$% 'r(#('-8 5-8>% !&/ The critical value !& $ (0' !sup) is de!ned as !& $ &(!sup). Accord-
ing to (27), it satis!es
(3 " µ" #) !& $ $(1'5)
& !sup
!0
&1' . (!)' 8! (29)
The left-hand side of (29) is strictly increasing in !, whereas the right-hand side is strictly de-
creasing for all ! $ (0' !sup). Furthermore, A"C(0) ! D"C(0) and A"C(!sup) 4 D"C(!sup).
Therefore, !& is unique. Moreover, according to (29),
!& " 2
,
,) $(1'5)
& !sup
!
"
&1' . (!)' 8! " (3 " µ" #) 2
,
(30)
According to (27),
*; $ &0' !sup' ' ! $ &(;) " 2
,
,) $(1'5)
& !sup
!
"
&1' . (!)' 8! " (3 " µ" #) 2
,
(31)
From (30) and (31) we deduce that (see also Figure A1)
*; $ &0' !sup' ' !& " 2
,
,) &(;) " 2
,
(32)
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Figure A1.
&/(6#%"'% *+ - A*"%#-r) %H>(8(7r(>A9 At a symmetric monetary equilibrium, ! $
&(;) " 2=, . Thus, condition (32) implies that:
(i) If !& ! +, , no monetary equilibrium exists.
(ii) If !& " +, , a monetary equilibrium exists. To see this, note that from (32), if !& 4 2=, ,
then &(2=,) 4 2=, , &(!sup) $ !& ! !sup, and from (28) &0(;) 4 0. Consequently, there
is at least one ; $ (2=,' !&) that satis!es ; $ &(;). If !& $ 2=, , equations (27) and (29)
imply that there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium with ; $ &(;) $ 2=, .
:29 Pr**+ *+ Pr*D*6(#(*" 2
@$% r%6%r5-#(*" 5-8>% !9 Inserting equation (7) into equation (8) yields !, ' 2 $ 0.
Hence, ! $ +
,
.
@$% 8*##%r(%6 *" A*"%) $ !9 Equation (7) implies that
$ ! $ $ # 2= (:) ' :*) (33)
To derive $ use equations (5), (6), and (8), and integrate by parts to get
(3 " µ" #) (:) ' :*) $ $ (1'5),
& !sup
+.,
&1' . (!)' 8! (34)
Replacing :) ' :* by its expression given in (34) yields the expression for $ in Proposition
2.
@$% 5-8>% +>"'#(*"6 :) -"= :*9 Given !' $ !, and :) ' :*, the value functions :) and
:* are uniquely determined by (5) and (6).
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&/(6#%"'% -"= >"(H>%"%669 Because there is a unique :) ' :* that satis!es (34), if it
exists, the monetary equilibrium is unique. For a monetary equilibrium to exist, :)':* " 2,
which from (33) implies $ & 1. It can be veri!ed from (34) that :) ' :* " 2 - 2=, & !&,
where !& satis!es (29).
:39 Pr**+ *+ Pr*D*6(#(*" 3
&/(6#%"'% -"= >"(H>%"%669 Equations (9), (10), and (11) yield
(3 " µ" #) * $ $ (1'5)
& !sup
!
&!+ (*)' *' 8. (!) (35)
From (12), (35), and integration by parts we have(
3 "
µ
1'5
)
! $ $ (1'5)
& !sup
!
&1' . (!)' 8! (36)
The left-hand side of (36) is strictly increasing and the right-hand side is strictly decreasing
in ! for all ! ! !sup. Because D"C(0) 4 A"C(0) $ 0 and A"C(!sup) 4 D"C(!sup) $ 0, a
unique reservation value ! $ (0' !sup) exists. For a given !, the equilibrium quantity of goods
traded in a match is the unique value of * that solves (12). For a given (!' *), (:)' :*) is
entirely determined by (9) and (10). Hence, the monetary equilibrium is unique. Note that
equations (12) and (36) imply that #!
#'
! 0, #!
#%
! 0' #0
#'
! 0, and #0
#%
! 0.
&!'(%"')9 Recall that the e!cient quantity *"! is an increasing function of the taste index
!. As a consequence, there is a threshold !/ for the taste index such that if ! 4 !/ , then
* ! *"! , and if ! ! !/ , then the opposite is true. The threshold !/ satis!es
!/+0(*) $ 1
Using the fact that !+(*) $ * and !+0(*"!) $ 1' and the concavity of +(/), it can be veri!ed
that * 4 *"! and therefore !/ 4 !. Consequently, if ! ! !, no trade takes place; if ! $ &!'!/),
the quantity exchanged is too high; and if ! 4 !/ , the quantity exchanged is too low.
J*"=(#(*" +*r !/ ! !sup9 To determine the critical value 3&, note that (12) and (36) yield
(3 " µ" #)
*
+ (*)
$ $ (1'5)
& !sup
#
$(#)
&1' . (!)' 8! (37)
The left-hand side of (37) is increasing in *, whereas the right-hand side is decreasing in *.
If !/ ! !sup, then *"!sup 4 *, respectively A"C(*"!sup) 4 D"C(*"!sup). Thus,(
3 "
µ
1'5
)
*"!sup 4 $ (1'5) +(*"!sup)
& !sup
#"!sup
$(#"!sup)
&1' . (!)' 8! (38)
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The quantity 3& is the value of 3 such that (38) is satis!ed with equality.
:E9 Pr**+ *+ Pr*D*6(#(*" E
@%rA6 *+ #r-=%9 Equality (15) and inequality (17) imply *! & :) ' :* for all ! $ &0' !sup'.
Denote by '! the multiplier associated with this constraint, and rewrite the program (16) to
get
ma,
0!
!+ (*!)' *! ' '! (:) ' :* ' *!)
The !rst-order and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
!+0 (*!) $ 1 " '! *! $ &0' !sup' (39)
'! (:) ' :* ' *!) $ 0 *! $ &0' !sup' (40)
Suppose, !rst, that inequality (17) is not binding ('! $ 0). This implies that *! $ *"! $
$ ! (:) ' :*) and $ ! & 1. Suppose, next, that inequality (17) is binding ('! 4 0). This
implies that $ ! $ 1 and *! $ :) ' :* ! *"! .
@$% #$r%6$*8= !19 From the previous discussion we have $ ! $ min+1' 0"!8%#8&,, where
0"!
8%#8& is increasing in !. De!ne !1 as the smallest ! for which the constraint $ ! & 1 binds.
It satis!es *"!' $ :) ' :*, which can be rewritten as
!1 $ 1
+0 (:) ' :*) (41)
If ! 4 !1, then *! $ :) ' :* ! *"! and $ ! $ 1, and if ! & !1, then *! $ *"! and $ ! ! 1.
&/(6#%"'% -"= >"(H>%"%669 Equations (13), (14), (15), and (41) yield
(3 " µ" #) (:) ' :*) $ $(1'5)" (42)
where " $
& 1
$0'(%!(&(
&
&!+(*"!)' *"! ' 8. (!) "
& !sup
1
$0'(%!(&(
&!+(:) ' :*)' (:) ' :*)' 8. (!)
Note that
("
( (:) ' :*) $
& !sup
!' &!+
0(:) ' :*)' 1' 8. (!) " 0
()"
( (:) ' :*))
$
& !sup
!' &!+
00(:) ' :*)' 8. (!) & 0
Equation (42) determines a unique :) ' :*. Indeed, the left-hand side of (42) is linear in
:) ' :*. The right-hand side of (42) is constant if !sup & !1, and strictly increasing and
strictly concave if !sup 4 !1. Moreover, A"C(0) $ D"C(0) $ 0 and A"C0(0) $ 3" µ" # !
D"C0(0) $ "%. Consequently, there is a unique strictly positive value of :) ' :* that
satis!es (42).
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J*"=(#(*" +*r !1 " !sup9 We have !1 " !sup - *"!sup & :) ' :*, which from (42) is also
equivalent to (
3 "
µ
1'5
)
*"!sup & $ (1'5)
& !sup
&
&!+(*"!)' *"! ' 8. (!) (43)
Denote by 3! the value of 3 that satis!es (43) with equality. Then !1 " !sup ,) 3 & 3!.
:F9 Pr**+ *+ Pr*D*6(#(*" F
The thresholds !6, % $ $E' A%, satisfy !6+0(:) ' :*) $ 1. Thus, !1 4 !/ i" :) ' :* is larger
with lotteries than without. From (12) and (35), the equation that determines :) ' :* in
the model without lotteries is
(3 " µ" #) (:) ' :*) $ $ (1'5)
& !sup
(%!(&
$'(%!(&(
&!+ (:) ' :*)' (:) ' :*)' 8. (!) (44)
With lotteries :)':* is determined by (42). From the fact that !+(*"!)'*"! 4 !+ (:) ' :*)'
(:) ' :*) for all ! *$ !, the RHS of (42) is strictly larger than the RHS of (44). Consequently,
:) ' :* is strictly larger with lotteries than without.
:I9 Pr**+ *+ Pr*D*6(#(*" I
@%rA6 *+ #r-=%9 According to (22), if the constraint (19) is not binding ('! $ 0), then
*! $ *
"
! . From (18), the monetary transfer equals -! $ *
"
!=&. In contrast, if (19) is binding
('! 4 0), then, from (18), *! $ $5( and -! $
5
(
. Thus
*! $ min
(
&6
5
' *"!
)
(45)
@$% #$r%6$*8= !49 The threshold !4 is the smallest ! for which the constraint -! & 5(
binds. Hence, !4 satis!es $5( $ *"!) , so that
!4+0(&6
5
)
$ 1 (46)
&/(6#%"'% -"= >"(H>%"%669 The model has a recursive structure. For a given !4, (46)
determines &6 . Given &6 , (45) determines *!. Given *!, (18) determines -! and (22)
determines '!. Furthermore, for a monetary equilibrium to exist, we must have & 4 0,
which implies from (46) that !4 4 0. In the following, we will demonstrate that there exists
a unique !4 4 0.
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By substituting for '! its expression given in (22), equation (24) becomes
&#!
&
$ "
'
$(1'5)
& !sup
!) &!+
0 (*!)' 1' 8. (!) " 1
*
(47)
By multiplying each side of (47) by !4, from (46), we have+&#!
&
' "
,!4 $ "$(1'5)& !sup!) &!'!4' 8. (!) (48)
In the steady state, the quantity &? is stationary. Therefore, 3
3!1 $
$!1
$
$ %. Integrating
by parts, and taking into account that $!1
$
$ %, we obtain the equation that determines !4
in the steady state:
(% ' ")!4 $ "$(1'5)& !sup!) &1' . (!)' 8! (49)
The left-hand side of (49) is strictly increasing in !4, whereas the right-hand side is strictly
decreasing in !4. Furthermore, A"C (0) $ 0 ! D"C(0) and A"C (!sup) 4 D"C(!sup) $ 0.
Consequently, there is a unique !4 $ (0' !sup) that satis!es (49). Finally, equation (49)
implies that when % approaches ", !4 approaches !sup.
K%8*'(#) *+ A*"%)9 The velocity of money is de!ned as the ratio of the money transfers
in one period divided by the money supply, i.e.,
# $
$(1'5)5 % !sup
&
-!8. (!)
6
(50)
Proposition 6 and (18) imply that -! $ *"! if ! & !4 and -! $ 5( if ! 4 !4. Consequently,
(50) can be rewritten as
# $
$(1'5)5
6!
& !)
&
*"!8. (!) " $(1'5)
& !sup
!) 8. (!)' (51)
where !4 is de!ned by (46). An increase in the rate of in"ation reduces 6!, and from (51)
increases #.
:L9 P-r%#* +r*"#(%r *+ #$% 7-r0-("("0 6%# (" #$% ("=(5(6(78% A*"%)M =(5(6(78%
0**=6 A*=%8
We consider a meeting between a buyer and a seller, where the taste index of the buyer is
!. Let S) (S*) denote the surplus of the buyer (seller) in the match. When bargaining, the
buyer and the seller take :) and :*, and accordingly the value of money (:)':*), as given.
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N(#$*># 8*##%r(%69 Without lotteries, the surpluses satisfy
S) $ !+(*)' (:) ' :*) (52)
S* $ '* " (:) ' :*) (53)
where * is the quantity produced by the seller for the buyer. The Pareto frontier is derived
by solving the following maximization problem:
ma,
0
S) $ !+(*)' (:) ' :*) s.t. (53)
Because there is one variable to be chosen and one constraint, the value of * is directly given
by (53). From (52) and (53), the equation for the Pareto frontier in the model without
lotteries is given by
S) $ !+ (:) ' :* ' S*)' (:) ' :*) (54)
The Pareto frontier is downward sloping and strictly concave, and at S* $ :) ' :* ' *"! its
slope is '1. At S* $ 0 the buyer’s surplus equals S) $ !+ (:) ' :*) ' (:) ' :*). This
quantity can be negative if ! is low. In this case, there will be no trade.
N(#$ 8*##%r(%69 With lotteries, the surpluses satisfy
S) $ !+(*)' $(:) ' :*) (55)
S* $ '* " $(:) ' :*) (56)
where $ is the probability that the indivisible unit of money changes hands.
The Pareto frontier is derived by solving the following maximization problem:
ma,
0#"
S) $ !+(*)' $(:) ' :*) s.t. (56) and 0 & $ & 1
Assume !rst that an interior solution to this program exists. Then we have
1 $ !+0(*) (57)
$ $
S* " *
:) ' :* (58)
and the equation for the Pareto frontier satis!es
S) " S* $ S" # !+(*"!)' *"!
where *"! satis!es (57).
Assume next that no interior solution exists. The constraint $ & 1 is binding i" the value
of $ given by (58) is larger than 1 (i.e. S* " :)':*' *"!). Accordingly, the equation of the
Pareto frontier is given by (54).
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APPENDIX B: Generalization of the terms of trade
In Appendix B we show that the claims we make in the text are also true for generalized
Nash bargaining.
O19 <"=(5(6(78% 0**=6 -"= ("=(5(6(78% A*"%) 3(#$ 8*##%r(%6
In this appendix, we show that lotteries on money remove the no-trade ine!ciency even when
the terms of trade are determined by the generalized Nash solution.26 We do not consider
the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium. We take as granted that
:) ' :* " 2, which is a necessary and su!cient condition for a monetary equilibrium.
Let ) $ (0' 1) be the buyers’ bargaining power, and $ ! the probability that money changes
hands in an !-meeting. The outcome of a negotiation between a buyer and a seller is a
$ ! $ &0' 1' that maximizes the following Nash product:
$ ! $ argma, &!, ' $ ! (:) ' :*)'& &'2 " $ ! (:) ' :*)'!#& (59)
s.t. 0 & $ ! & 1 (60)
!, " $ ! (:) ' :*) (61)
2 & $ ! (:) ' :*) (62)
A necessary condition for (61) and (62) to be satis!ed is that !, " 2. The !rst-order
conditions imply that the optimal $ ! satis!es
$ ! $
'!#&(!,"&+
8%#8&
1
if
+
,
& ! & 8%#8&#&+
'!#&(,
! 4 8%#8&#&+
'!#&(,
(63)
The participation constraints (61) and (62) are satis!ed for all ! " +
,
. Indeed, for all
! $
/
+
,
' 8%#8&#&+
'!#&(,
0
we have
!, ' $ ! (:) ' :*) $ ) (!, ' 2) " 0
'2 " $ ! (:) ' :*) $ (1' )) (!, ' 2) " 0
If ! 4 8%#8&#&+
'!#&(, , the participation constraints are satis!ed, because :) ' :* " 2.
26We only allow lotteries on money, because we want to focus on the welfare consequences of indivisible
money. When agents use lotteries on both goods and money, the main di"erence is that the good changes
hands with probability less than one if ! is large and if the sellers have su!cient bargaining power. The
fact that agents trade goods with probability less than one corresponds to what we call the too-little-trade
ine!ciency in the divisible goods, indivisible money, and lottery model of Section 3.3.
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The surplus in the match of the buyer is ) (!, ' 2) for all ! & 8%#8&#&+
'!#&(, and !, '
(:) ' :*) for all ! 4 8%#8&#&+'!#&(, . This surplus is increasing in !. Therefore, buyers choose
a reservation value ! for the taste index below which they refuse to trade. The reservation
value ! is such that buyers are indi"erent between trading and not trading. Consequently,
the reservation value is ! $ +
,
, which coincides with the value that a social planner would
choose.
O29 4(5(6(78% 0**=6 -"= ("=(5(6(78% A*"%)
This appendix shows that the no-trade, the too-much-trade, and the too-little-trade
ine!ciencies that we found in Section 3.3 are also present when the terms of trade are
determined through generalized Nash bargaining. We will neither demonstrate the existence
of a monetary equilibrium nor discuss its uniqueness. We will assume that :) ' :* 4 0,
which is a necessary condition for the existence of a monetary equilibrium.
@$% 7-r0-("("09 The bargaining power of buyers is ) $ (0' 1), and the outcome of the
bargaining is given by the generalized Nash solution. During the negotiation the bargainers
continue to meet other traders. Consequently, the threat points of buyers and sellers are :)
and :*, respectively (see Trejos and Wright, 1995). Denote by *! the solution to the general
Nash bargaining game in a !-meeting. Then
*! $ argma,
0
&!+(*)' (:) ' :*)'& &'* " :) ' :*'!#&
The !rst-order condition is
)!+0(*!) ('*! " :) ' :*) $ (1' )) &!+(*!)' (:) ' :*)' (64)
From (64), we can show that:
(*!
(!
$
(1' )) (:) ' :*) =!)
)+00(*!)C* ' +0(*!) ! 0
where C* $ '*! " :) ' :* is the seller surplus. Note that the participation constraint of
the seller requires C* " 0.
@$% r%6%r5-#(*" 5-8>% !9 From #0!
#!
! 0 we deduce that the LHS of (64) is increasing in
!/ As a consequence, the surplus of the buyer, C) $ !+(*!)' (:) ' :*), is also increasing in
!. The reservation property holds, which implies that there is a reservation value ! satisfying
!+(*!) $ :) ' :* (65)
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@$% ("%!'(%"'(%6 (6%% Q(0>r% O2)9 According to (65), if :) ':* 4 0, then both ! 4 0
and *! 4 0. Consequently, the no-trade ine!ciency remains. The concavity of the utility
function implies that the too-much-trade ine!ciency is also always present. To see this,
note !rst that equations (64) and (65) imply that the buyer surplus and the seller surplus
are zero when ! $ !, which implies that *! satis!es !+(*!) $ *!. Note next that *"! satis!es
!+0(*"!) $ 1. By combining these two equations we !nd +
0(*"!) $
9'0!(
0!
, which can only be
satis!ed if *! 4 *"! . Finally, because *! is decreasing in ! and *
"
! is increasing in !, there
exists a threshold !/ such that *!* $ *"!* . The too-little-trade ine!ciency is present under
generalized Nash bargaining if !/ ! !sup.
Figure B2. Figure B3.
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We will show that with lotteries on money the only ine!ciency that remains is the too-little-
trade ine!ciency. We will also show under which condition this ine!ciency vanishes.
@$% 7-r0-("("09 The terms of trade in an !-meeting maximize the Nash product:
(*!' $ !) $ argma,
0#"
&!+(*)' $ (:) ' :*)'& &'* " $ (:) ' :*)'!#& s.t. $ ! & 1 (66)
If the constraint on $ ! is not binding, then
*! $ *
"
! and $ ! $
(1' )) !+(*"!) " )*"!
:) ' :*
Hence, the constraint on $ ! is binding if and only if
(1' )) !+(*"!) " )*"! 4 :) ' :* (67)
The LHS of (67) is increasing in !. Consequently, there exists a !1 satisfying
(1' ))!1+(*"!') " )*"!' $ :) ' :*
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If the constraint $ ! & 1 is binding, *! satis!es (64) and $ ! $ 1 . Equation (64) implies that
*! is a decreasing function of !. Because *"! is strictly increasing in !, we have *! ! *
"
! for all
! 4 !1.
@$% ("%!'(%"'(%6 (6%% Q(0>r% O3)9 For all ! & !1 we have *! $ *"! and $ ! & 1, and for
all ! 4 !1, *! ! *"! and $ ! $ 1. This con!rms that with lotteries the only ine!ciency left is
the too-little-trade ine!ciency.
@$% '*"=(#(*" +*r %!'(%"')9 Traders exchange e!cient quantities in all meetings if!1 " !sup. This condition can be rewritten as follows:
(1' )) !sup+(*"!sup) " )*"!sup ! :) ' :* (68)
If !1 " !sup, then *! $ *"! and $ ! (:) ' :*) $ (1' )) !+(*"!) " )*"! for all !. Consequently,
the value functions of buyers and sellers satisfy
3:) $ $ (1'5) )
& !sup
&
&!+(*"!)' *"! ' 8. (!)' µ (:) ' :*)
3:* $ $5 (1' ))
& !sup
&
&!+(*"!)' *"! ' 8. (!) " # (:) ' :*)
Consequently,
(3 " µ" #) (:) ' :*) $ $ () '5)
& !sup
&
&!+(*"!)' *"! ' 8. (!)
The condition (68) yields
$ () '5) % !sup
&
&!+(*"!)' *"! ' 8. (!)
3 " µ" #
4 (1' )) !+(*"!sup) " )*"!sup
First, a necessary condition for e!ciency is that ) 4 5 . This implies that the too-little-
trade ine!ciency does not vanish if the bargaining power of buyers is less than the fraction
of buyers in the economy. Second, in the absence of in"ation (µ $ # $ 0) and if ) 4 5 , the
e!ciency condition is satis!ed for 3 close to zero. If agents become very patient and if the
bargaining power of buyers is su!ciently high, then the too-little-trade ine!ciency vanishes.
OE9 4(5(6(78% 0**=6 -"= =(5(6(78% A*"%)
@$% 0-A%9 The terms of trades are determined through bargaining games with alternating
o"ers (see Shi, 1999, 2001).27 We consider the bargaining between agent % of household %
and an agent ( from any other household. Each period is divided into an in!nite number of
27See Section 4 for additional details of the bargaining protocol.
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subperiods of length $. If, in a given subperiod, it is agent %’s turn to make an o"er and
agent ( rejects the o"er, in the following subperiod it is agent (’s turn to make a countero"er.
If an o"er by a buyer is refused, the negotiation breaks down with probability )$ () $ (0' 1)).
If an o"er by a seller is refused, the negotiation breaks down with probability (1' ))$. We
will see that the parameter ) can be interpreted as the bargaining power of buyers. The
possibility of an exogenous breakdown of the negotiation gives an incentive to traders to
agree immediately.
In the alternating o"er game, o"ers and countero"ers converge to the same limiting
proposal when $ goes to zero. Consequently, the !rst-mover advantage vanishes when $
goes to zero.28 Because of this and because, as we will see, it facilitates the derivation of the
envelope condition, we let members of household % make the !rst o"er in all meetings. In
the symmetric equilibrium all households have the same characteristics. Consequently, the
!rst o"ers of household % are always accepted. Moreover, because the length of time between
two consecutive o"ers is in!nitesimal, these !rst o"ers are exactly equal to the countero"ers
that household %’s bargaining partners make.
@$% *"%r69 The bargaining strategies are determined at the level of the household. We
assume that these bargaining strategies depend on the speci!c taste index of the buyer in
the match, !, but they do not depend on the speci!c level of money holdings or the speci!c
marginal value of money of the buyer. Nonetheless, the bargaining strategies depends on the
distribution of money holdings of the buyers and on the distribution of their marginal utilities
of money. These two distributions, however, are degenerate in equilibrium.29 Assume !rst
that agent % of household % is the buyer, and that in a given subperiod it is his turn to make
an o"er. The buyer, following the strategy given to him by household %, proposes that the
seller produces *7! units of output in exchange for -
7
! units of money if the quality of the
match is !. There are two types of constraints that the buyer’s household % must take into
account. First, the proposed amount of money cannot exceed the buyer’s money holdings,
i.e.,
-7! &
?
n
(69)
28This is a standard argument in the bargaining literature. See, for example, Muthoo (1999, Chapter 3),
Osborne and Rubinstein (1990, Chapter 3).
29If sellers can condition their bargaining strategies on the speci!c level of money holdings of their partner
in the match, then, because of the holdup problem, the too-little-trade ine!ciency does not vanish under
the Friedman rule. Nonetheless, it is feasible to reduce the growth rate of the money supply below what is
prescribed by the Friedman rule to eradicate the too-little-trade ine!ciency. See Berentsen and Rocheteau
(2001) on this point.
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This constraint must be satis!ed because trade is decentralized and so, during a match, each
buyer is separated from other members of the household. The second constraint on the o"er
is that it must give the partner (a seller from another household) a surplus that is greater
than or equal to the partner’s reservation surplus. The seller’s household obtains the surplus
!-7! ' *7! by accepting the o"er, where !-7! is the value of the amount of money -7! to the
seller’s household, and *7! is the production cost. Denote by B
:
! the expected surplus of the
seller if he rejects the o"er (the reservation surplus): it is taken as given by the household
of the buyer. Note that because the buyer and the seller have opposite interests, an optimal
o"er must make the seller indi"erent between accepting and rejecting. Consequently, the
buyer o"er
-
*7!' -
7
!
.
satis!es
'*7! " -7!! $ B:! (70)
To derive the reservation surplus B:!, note that if the seller rejects the o"er (but stays in the
game), the game passes into the next round without breakdown with probability 1 ' )$,
in which the seller proposes (&:'X:). Taking into account the breakdown probability, the
reservation surplus of the seller is
B:! $ (1' )$) &'&:! "X:!!' (71)
Assume now that agent % is the seller. Then the seller o"er (*:!' -
:
!) satis!es
-:! &
6
5
(72)
!+ (*:!)' -:!! $ B7! (73)
where the buyer’s reservation surplus B7! is
B7! $ (1' (1' ))$)
#
!+
-
&7!
.'X7!!$ (74)
@$% Dr*0r-A *+ #$% $*>6%$*8=9 For each period, the household chooses
-
?"!' *
7
!' -
7
!' *
:
!' -
:
!
.
to solve the following dynamic programming problem:
: (?) $ ma,
3+1#0+!#2
+
!#0
,
! #2
,
!
'
$5(1'5)
(& !sup
&
!+
-
*7!
.
8. (!)'
& !sup
&
*:!8. (!)
)
" ": (?"!)
*
(75)
s.t. (70), (69), (73), (72), and
?"! '? $ $ " $(1'5)5
& !sup
&
-:!8. (!)' $(1'5)5
& !sup
&
-7!8. (!) (76)
where equation (76) describes the law of motion of money holdings.
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Denote by '! (*!) the multipliers that are associated with constraints (69) ((72)). Then
the !rst-order conditions and the envelope condition are as follows:
!+0
-
*7!
.
$
'! " &
!
*! $ &0' !sup' (77)
!+0 (*:!) $
!
& ' *! *! $ &0' !sup' (78)
'!
+?
5
' -7!
,
$ 0 *! $ &0' !sup' (79)
*!
(
6
5
' -:!
)
$ 0 *! $ &0' !sup' (80)
&#!
"
$ $(1'5)
& !sup
&
'! 8. (!) " & (81)
There are two additional conditions relative to the !rst-order conditions in the text. Equation
(78) states the marginal cost of production must be equal to the marginal utility of the money
received by the seller. Condition (78) is the additional Kuhn-Tucker condition.
@$% %H>(8(7r(>A *"%r69 At the symmetric equilibrium, which we will focus on, the values
for the di"erent variables of the household % are just equal to the values of the same variables
for the other households. Consequently, & $ !, -6! $ X
6
!, and *
6
! $ &
6
!, where % $ G' H.
Equations (70), (71), (73), and (74) can be rewritten as follows:
'*7! " -7!& $ (1' )$) &'*:! " -:!&' (82)
!+ (*:!)' -:!& $ (1' (1' ))$)
#
!+
-
*7!
.' -7!&$ (83)
First, we show that for any !, '! and *! are either both positive or both zero. Suppose,
on the contrary, that '! 4 0 and *! $ 0. From (77) and (78), !+0(*:!) $ 1 and !+
0(*7!) 4 1.
Hence, *:! 4 *
7
!. Furthermore, according to (79), '! 4 0 implies that -
7
! $ ?=5 . From (82),
when $ approaches 0 we have *:! ' *7! $
#
-:! ' 3(
$
&. The left-hand side is positive, whereas
the right-hand side cannot be positive because -:! & 3( (*! $ 0). A similar contradiction
appears when we assume that '! $ 0 and *! 4 0. Hence, '! and *! are either both positive
or both zero.
Q(r6# '-6%1 If '! 4 0 and *! 4 0, the constraints on money holdings are binding and
therefore -:! $ -
7
! $
3
(
. Equations (82) and (83) yield
*:! ' *7! $ ')$
/
'*:! "
?
5
&
0
!+ (*:!)' !+
-
*7!
.
$ ' (1' ))$
/
!+
-
*7!
.' ?
5
&
0
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The !rst equation implies that lim"$& *:! $ lim"$& *
7
! $ *!. Divide the second equation by
the !rst, and take the limit as $+ 0, to get
!+0 (*!) $
(1' )) #!+ (*!)' 3(&$
)
#'*! " 3(&$ (84)
Note that the *! that solves (84) also maximizes the asymmetric Nash product
*! $ argma,
0
/
!+(*)' ?
5
&
0& /
'* " ?
5
&
0!#&
This con!rms our interpretation that ) is the buyer’s bargaining power.
S%'*"= '-6%1 If '! $ 0 and *! $ 0, equations (77) and (78) imply *! $ *"! . Moreover,
when $+ 0, (82) and (83) imply that the amount of money exchanged, -!, satis!es
'*"! " -!& $ (1' )) &!+(*"!)' *"! ' (85)
Figure B4.
@$% ("%!'(%"'(%6 (6%% Q(0>r% OE)9 Let *;! denote the value of *! that satis!es (84).
One can show that *;! is a decreasing function of !. Consequently,
*! $ min (*
"
! ' *
;
!)
Let’s de!ne !4 as the value of ! such that *"! $ *;!. For all ! ! !4 we have *! $ *"! and
-! !
5
(
, and for all ! 4 !4, *! ! *"! and -! $ 5( . This con!rms our conjecture that the only
ine!ciency left with divisible money is the too-little-trade ine!ciency.
4%#%rA("-#(*" *+ !49 When ! $ !4, we have *!) $ *"!) and -!) $ 3( . Thus, the pair
(!4' *!)) satis!es !4+0(*!)) $ 1 (86)
'*!) " ?5 & $ (1' )) &!4+(*!))' *!) ' (87)
In the plane (*!) '!4), (86) gives an upward-sloping curve, whereas (87) gives a downward-
sloping curve. Furthermore, the curve given by (87) moves upward as ?& increases. As a
consequence, !4 is increasing in the real stock of money, ?&.
39
@$% A-r0("-8 5-8>% *+ A*"%) &9 Using the fact that for all ! & !4 one has '! $ 0, the
envelope condition (81) can be rewritten as follows:
&#!
"
$ $(1'5)
& !sup
!) '!8. (!) " &
Divide this equation by &, substitute for '!=& its expression given in (77), and rearrange to
get
'$!1.$(
%
' 1
$(1'5) $
& !sup
!) &!+
0 (*;!)' 1' 8. (!) (88)
In the steady state, the real value of money holdings, &?, is stationary. Therefore, 3
3!1 $
$!1
$
$ %. Consequently, from (88), &? is determined by& !sup
!) &!+
0 (*;! (&?))' 1' 8. (!) $
'
%
' 1
$ (1'5) (89)
Let (?&)" denote the value of ?& such that !4 $ !sup. The derivative of the LHS of (89)
with respect to ?& is
(A"C
(?&
$
& !sup
!) !+
00 (*;!)
(*;!
(?&
8. (!) ! 0 for all ?& ! (?&)"
because from (84) #0
-
!
#3$
4 0. Furthermore, A"C(0) $ "% and A"C ((?&)") $ 0. As a
consequence, there is a unique ?& $ (0' (?&)") that satis!es (89).
&!'(%"')9 According to (86), (87), and (89), for all % ! " we have ?& ! (?&)" and!4 ! !sup. This implies that the too-little-trade ine!ciency is always present if % 4 ". If
% + ", then ?& + " and !4 + !sup. E!ciency in the decentralized economy requires!4 $ !sup, which is achieved by % $ ". The Friedman rule holds.
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